Saudi Arabia And The Yemen Crisis

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries are becoming increasingly alarmed by the burgeoning influence and military successes of the Ansar Allah Houthi militias in Yemen which has taken over the seat of government in Sanaa and is currently advancing on Aden where the country’s legitimate President, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi has relocated.
The Shia militias are now the number one security priority for the GCC and for Saudi Arabia in particular since it shares a long border with Yemen to the south of the country and has its own restive Shia minority in the oil-rich east.

 The ‘Shiite’ problem is now of more concern in the Gulf than the Islamic State, particularly because of Iran’s unambiguous military and ideological support for the Houthis.
On Monday, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Saud al-Faisal, told reporters in Riyadh that (Sunni) Arab nations would endeavour to ‘protect the region from aggression’ and criticized ‘Iranian interference’ in the region. He urged the Houthi rebels to vacate the seat of government and allow the return on President Hadi.
Houthi leaders have been invited to participate in a GCC summit, but their youthful leader, Abdel Malik, suggested yesterday that he would decline because he refuses to be under the umbrella of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and does not recognize the legitimacy of his presidency.
The Houthi position is strengthening by the day and threatens the security of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait through which much of the region’s shipping must pass (including oil). They have already taken the important port of Makha as well as Taiz and its airport and look set to attempt Aden.
Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is a strident supporter and ally of the Houthis and has made no comment, either negative nor positive, on the Saudi call for all regional powers to confront the Shiite forces and their Iranian allies.
We do not know what further steps the Saudis can take to prevent Yemen being overrun by the Houthis but there may be some clues in Prince Saud al-Faisal’s comments at yesterday’s press conference which was also attended by Philip Hammond, his British counterpart.
Prince Faisal talked of taking ‘all necessary steps’ to reverse the region’s burgeoning Iranian influence. If the political process fails to find a negotiated settlement with the Houthis in Yemen, does this mean that a military intervention?
Yemeni Foreign Minister Riad Yassin has called for a military intervention against the Houthis by GCC ‘Peninsula Shield’ forces to protect their vital interests. Will they agree to this request?
Consisting of units from each Gulf state, ‘Peninsula Shield’ has been deployed but once since its inception: in 1982, ie 29 years ago. In Bahrain in 2011, 1500 Saudi troops along with a few hundred from the United Arab Emirates intervened to put down the embryonic ‘Arab Spring’ uprising.
There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has a strong army and up to the minute air capabilities, but when it experienced its own Houthi rebellion in the southern provinces of Jizan and Najran, which are characterized by the rough terrain and mountainous terrain, it took three months to bring it under control. How much longer will it require to bring all the Houthis of the whole of Yemen under control? And at what cost, both human and financial?
In our opinion, the greatest danger to Hadi in Yemen is not even the ‘Ansar Allah’ Houthi brigades, but former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Yemeni forces loyal to him. The man is a strategic mastermind, a political veteran, and his head is full of the Yemeni preoccupation with revenge – in this case directed at all those who toppled him, with President Hadi topping the list.
The irony here is the previous close alliance between the two men: Hadi was a Major General in the South Yemen army after it achieved independence, but sided with Saleh during the 1994 civil war, following him into exile in North Yemen. Saleh appointed him first Minister of Defence and then Vice President on 3 October 1994.
The sectarian aspect of the current crisis must concern us all and has not only regional but also international implications. The fight against al-Qaeda has been hampered by the Houthi uprising and the general chaos that has enveloped the country. The Sunni population is now more inclined to seek protection and the chance of military victory among the ranks of al-Qaeda and the new regional branch of Islamic State which seeks to eclipse it.
If Iran takes control of Bab el Mandeb, Egypt’s President al-Sisi will certainly be inclined to engage militarily to protect Egypt’s interest in the Red Sea and the Suez canal.
Prince Saud al-Faisal told journalists that ‘the security of the Gulf is the security of Yemen’. If that is the case, why was Yemen left to suffer by its wealthy neighbour and why did Riyadh, with its $2 trillion surplus allow its Yemeni brothers and sisters to go hungry all these years with the inevitable consequence that one day people would revolt… whether students, unemployed youth, Islamic extremists or… as is currently the case… the Houthis?
The Saudis must bear some responsibility at least for Yemen’s descent into bloody chaos.